I.

The Mission

 

1. The United Nations has published numerous reports on the Israel-Palestine conflict. In general, stringent standards of evidence and law have been applied. (See for example the voluminous reports on, respectively, Israel’s 2008-9 assault on Gaza, and Israel’s 2018 repression of the Great March of Return in Gaza.) But, succumbing to U.S.-Israeli pressure, the UN has on occasion also whitewashed Israel. (See for example the report commissioned by the Secretary-General regarding Israel’s 2010 assault on a humanitarian convoy headed for Gaza, and the report on Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza.)

 

2. A new report, commissioned by the Secretary-General, has just been released (“Mission Report: Official visit of the Office of the SRSG-SVC to Israel and the Occupied West Bank, 29 January-14 February 2024”). The primary author of the report is Pramila Patten, the “UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.” The subject-matter of this report is sexual violence committed by Gaza-based Palestinians on 7 October 2023. Especially in light of the incendiary subject-matter, it is a skimpy document running to a mere 17 pages. The UN report on violence during the 2018 Great March of Return clocked in at a hefty 250 pages.

 

3. The Patten mission’s mandate perplexes. Its initial press release (24 January 2024) states that its purpose was to “gather, analyze and verify relevant information regarding allegations of” sexual violence. But it also emphatically states that, although it included a small team of technical experts, the “mission is neither intended nor mandated to be investigative in nature.” If, on the one hand, the mission was mandated to “gather, analyze and verify” evidence of sexual violence, and refers in the report to its “findings” and to having “verified” alleged instances of sexual violence; yet, on the other hand, the mission emphatically declares that it wasn’t “investigative in nature”—then what exactly was it? The press release further states that the mission “aims to give voice to survivors, witnesses, recently released hostages” of sexual violence. But if it wasn’t an investigative body, it’s cause for wonder how it would even know whose “voice” to give voice to. Isn’t this putting the cart before the horse?

 

4. The report renders discrete judgments that even a bona fide investigative body normally wouldn’t be competent to make. It teases out legal delineations—“reasonable grounds to believe” versus “clear and convincing information” (also: “a finding of fact”)—rarely found in reports issued by the UN (or human rights groups). The standard practice is to identify possible (“reasonable grounds to believe”) breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law and then call for a formal investigation. But the Patten mission, although confessedly something less than an investigative body, makes judgments that go well beyond those of a typical investigative body to the point of near-certainty (“a finding of fact”) befitting the final verdict in a court of law. What’s yet more odd, the Patten mission renders these fine determinations even as it acknowledges severe constraints imposed by limited evidence and time.

 

5. If it wasn’t a bona fide investigative body; if sufficient evidence was hard to come by; if it was pressed for time to complete its mission—if all this is true, then it’s unclear why the Patten mission reached any conclusions, be they tentative or certain. Why this rush to judgment? And if this non-investigative body also wasn’t in a position to “give voice” to the victims of sexual violence before said victimhood was at least tentatively established by an official investigative body, it’s hard to make out what was the point of this mission. It’s not as if Israel hasn’t already made on its own, and via overwhelmingly sympathetic media abroad, its very best evidentiary case a thousand times over.

 

6. In this regard it can’t but be wondered why Israel extended the “invitation” to Pramila Patten in the first place and why the Patten mission “benefited from the full cooperation of the Government of Israel.” This was unprecedented, a first. In the past as well as in the instant case, Israel has consistently and categorically refused to cooperate with formal UN investigations. If the evidence Israel has assembled is so robust—the Patten mission concluded that hostages were almost certainly raped—what did it have to fear from an official UN investigation carried out by competent and experienced personnel? The stock reply is: the UN is biased against Israel. But the Patten mission was itself mandated by the UN. If Israel invited Patten’s UN mission, but has firmly barred entry to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Commission of Inquiry, surely there must be a reason. Alas, Patten never explores—let alone answers—this tantalizing question.

 

 

II.

The Evidence

7. The Patten mission visited Israel for a little over two weeks. It met with various national ministries, intelligence agencies, and senior government officials; visited “with the support of the Israeli authorities” the sites of the attacks on 7 October; viewed photographic and video evidence overwhelmingly curated by the Israeli government or available in open sources; interviewed survivors of 7 October, released hostages, and first-responders. In other words, on one side it was an Israeli full-court press, and on the opposite side, it was the sort of tour “Friends of the Soviet Union” used to go on in Stalin’s day and “Friends of the People’s Republic of China” in Mao’s day. If any dissent, even a peep, from the official “narrative” was uttered by the mission’s Israeli interlocutors, if the mission stumbled on some irreconcilable finding that incensed its Israeli interlocutors—the report makes no mention of it. Put otherwise, if the mission didn’t question let alone undermine the current Israeli “narrative,” then it’s small wonder that they got on swimmingly.

 

8. The report states that “the national authorities faced numerous challenges in the collection of evidence and pursuit of their investigations.” Consequently, Israel is said to have possessed and could only make available “very limited forensic” evidence, while “a high number of bodies with destructive burn damage … made the identification of potential crimes of sexual violence impossible.” In addition, the mission met with only “a small number of survivors and/or witnesses … who provided information on instances of sexual violence.” The “very limited” to “small” to “impossible” evidence did not, however, deter the non-investigative mission from drawing fine legal discriminations, not to mention a near-definitive “finding of fact.”

 

9. The report further states that “While the mission team was able to meet with some released hostages as well as with some survivors and witnesses of the attacks, it did not meet with any survivor-victim of sexual violence from 7 October despite concerted efforts encouraging them to come forward (emphasis added). Doesn’t it give pause that, more than three months after the attack, none of the alleged victims of—according to the Israeli government and the New York Times—rampant, systematic sexual violence on 7 October stepped forward to testify before the mission? Not one. The report endeavors to paper over this glaring lacuna by pointing up “the lack of trust by survivors” in the United Nations. But in the instant case, it was the Israeli government itself that orchestrated this UN mission’s visit. It’s hard to fathom that in a country celebrated for its tribal closing of ranks in the face of external danger, and—not incidentally—in a culture known for its libertine sexual frankness, not a single victim of not just rape but sexual violence of any type was willing, and couldn’t be coaxed, to testify before a Government-blessed mission at such an existential moment in the nation’s history.

 

 

III.

The Findings

 

10. The Patten mission that was not “investigative in nature” nonetheless concludes that “there are reasonable grounds to believe” that sexual violence, “including rape and gang rape,” occurred. It bases its findings on these pieces of evidence:

 

 “[F]ully naked or partially naked bodies from the waist down were recovered—mostly women—with hands tied and shot multiple times, often in the head…. Although circumstantial, such a pattern of undressing and restraining of victims may be indicative of some forms of sexual violence.” It may be indicative; it also may not be. The mission itself concedes—albeit buried at the tail end of the report—that “in the medicolegal assessment of available photos and videos, no tangible indications of rape could be identified,” and “no digital evidence specifically depicting acts of sexual violence was found in open sources,” and “no discernible pattern of genital mutilation could be established.” It takes time for the magnitude of this admission to sink in. Consider further this detail: “The mission team … reviewed over 5,000 photos, around 50 hours and several audio files of footage of the attacks, provided partly by various state agencies and through an independent online review of various open sources, to identify potential instances and indications of conflict-related sexual violence. The content encompassed the actual attacks and their immediate aftermath, captured through militants’ bodycams and dashcams, individual cellphones, CCTV, and traffic surveillance cameras.” Fully 5,000 photos and 50 hours of footage, from every conceivable angle and by every conceivable electronic device—yet the mission was unable to isolate a single direct image of sexual violence, even as no less than gang rapes were allegedly occurring in open space. If the report was properly packaged and publicized, the title would read: “October 7: No Direct Material Evidence of Rape.”

*

 “Based on the examination of available information, including credible statements by eyewitnesses, there are reasonable grounds to believe that multiple incidents of rape, including gang rape, occurred in and around the Nova [music] festival site. Credible information was obtained regarding multiple incidents whereby victims were subjected to rape and then killed.” (The report also makes fleeting mention without passing judgment on alleged acts of necrophilia.) The report does not specify how many of these credible eyewitnesses it interviewed. And crucially, it does not quantify even roughly how many instances of sexual violence are alleged to have occurred: “multiple” can denote “more than once” or “manifold” (Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Edition). Surely it makes a difference whether the Patten mission is attesting to 2, 20, 200, or 2,000 instances of “rape and/or gang rape.” Why then the sloppy—indeed, professionally irresponsible—vagueness?

*

“There are reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence occurred on and around Road 232. Credible information based on corroborating witness accounts describes an incident involving the rape of two women.”

*

“There are reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence occurred in kibbutz Re’im, including rape. This included the rape of a woman outside of a bomb shelter at the entrance of kibbutz Re’im, which was corroborated by witness testimonies and digital material.”

 

In sum, the non-investigative investigative Patten mission, basing itself on an unspecified number of “credible” witnesses, found “reasonable grounds” to conclude or “verified” that “multiple”—which, for all one knows, might mean two—instances of rape occurred at the music festival and another three instances of rape occurred on a road and in a kibbutz. Two plus three equals five. Appalling, no doubt, but also a far cry from allegations by Israel and its media stenographers that Hamas carried out “systematic” and “widespread” rape as a “weapon” of war.

 

11. The report goes on to state that “[a]t least two of the allegations of sexual violence [at kibbutz Be’eri] previously reported were determined by the mission team to be unfounded, due to either new superseding information or inconsistency in the information gathered.” It further notes alleged instances of sexual violence at other locales “which could not be verified.” The report does not state whether Israel publicly withdrew the allegations of sexual violence that it itself now privately concedes to have been false. Surely that piece of information would be of crucial importance in assessing other allegations propagated by Israel that “could not be verified.” In fact, the Israeli government has not publicly retracted all its “unfounded” allegations. It is also cause for wonder why the mission benignly characterizes the false claims of sexual violence as innocent mistakes by Israel and doesn’t entertain the possibility of calculated disinformation that was subsequently exposed. Was the “beheaded babies” horror tale also an accounting error?

 

12. The report states that, “[b]ased on the first-hand accounts of released hostages, the mission team received clear and convincing information that sexual violence, including rape, sexualized torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment occurred against some women and children during their time in captivity and has reasonable grounds to believe that this violence may be ongoing.” Of all the findings of this non-investigative investigative body, this is surely the most explosive. The stakes couldn’t be higher: it provides a plausible pretext for Israel to urgently proceed on its offensive even as Gazan children starve—Israeli women and children held in captivity are still being raped and sexually tortured! Yet, the report dispatches this charge unequivocally validated by the mission in all of one sentence. Whereas “clear and convincing information” crosses the highest threshold, the mission doesn’t disclose the evidentiary basis for its conclusive finding. The report states that it is “[b]ased on the first-hand accounts of released hostages,” but this wording obscures whether or not the mission actually met with them, and it is left to the imagination why these “first-hand accounts” standing on their own would, or could, be dispositive. If hostage rape victims held in captivity for months did in fact meet with the mission, then it baffles why not a single one of the 7 October rape victims who weren’t held hostage stepped forward. The report ascertains that “some” of the hostages were raped; but what prevented the mission from specifying exactly how many? It purports “reasonable grounds to believe” that the rape and sexual torture are ongoing; but how can it possibly know this? If Israel possessed any evidence that the hostages still in captivity were being raped, surely it would have broadcast it far and wide. The non-investigative Patten mission would appear to be not only investigative but, to boot, clairvoyant. It gets curiouser and curiouser. Hamas has indignantly denied the rape charge, while this charge has played a salient role in demonizing Hamas. If while in captivity the released hostages had been personally raped or could bear personal witness to Hamas’s sexual savagery, then why didn’t Hamas simply kill them instead of setting them free: who would know? The mission states that it adhered to a “survivor/victim-centered” approach. It would appear that this approach required total suspension of the critical faculty.

 

13. The Patten mission states that it was “unable to establish the prevalence” of sexual violence “during and after the 7 October attacks,” and that a “comprehensive assessment … would require a fully-fledged investigation by competent bodies with adequate time and capacity.” But truth be told: if it wasn’t a “competent” investigative body, then it was “unable to establish” anything. Further, its vague quantification, as well as its repeated references to “circumstantial” evidence that “may be indicative” and to allegations that “couldn’t be verified,” certainly gave credence to the official Israeli “narrative” that the sexual violence was widespread.

 

 

IV.

Final Observations

 

14. The report concedes that “the information gathered by the mission team was in a large part sourced from Israeli national institutions,” while the report’s findings carry bare minimum weight as the “mission is neither intended nor mandated to be investigative in nature.” The only discernible purposes of Patten’s tawdry mission reduce to, first, acting as yet another purveyor, vehicle, conduit, and conveyance of the “evidence” Israel has been propagating since 7 October, and, second, lending the UN’s authoritative imprimatur to this “evidence.” The analysis presented here began with the puzzle, What exactly is the Patten mission? That question can now be tentatively answered. It is neither an investigative nor a quasi- investigative body. On the contrary, it is a stage production directed by the UN bureaucracy to appease Israel and its powerful backer in Washington. How and why Ms. Patten came to play the starring role in this theatrical extravaganza are of secondary importance.

 

15. The Patten mission “benefitted from the full cooperation of the Government of Israel.” Yet, it couldn’t locate a single victim of sexual violence or a single piece of direct evidence, be it forensic or digital, of sexual violence on 7 October. It therefore beggars belief that rampant sexual violence occurred on that day. The allegation that Hamas systematically utilized rape as a weapon of war can be safely deposited in the same dumpster as the debunked allegation that Hamas built a mammoth command-and-control center beneath al-Shifa hospital.

 

16. The report describes “three cumulative waves of attacks” from Gaza on 7 October: first, “Hamas commandos”; then, sundry “paramilitary organizations … that joined the ongoing operation”; and finally, unaffiliated, random “armed and unarmed individuals.” The report further states that “it did not gather information and/or draw conclusions on attribution of alleged violations to specific armed groups.” The available evidence is entirely consistent with the postulate that, if rapes did occur on 7 October—and most likely they did—these were isolated incidents perpetrated in the main by Gaza riff-raff and hooligans who entered Israel in the third wave. It is this writer’s considered opinion—admittedly speculative in nature but nonetheless grounded in the known details of the 7 October attack, its modus operandi, and the predispositions of its perpetrators—that this is the most plausible scenario.

 

[The quoted passages in this article are culled from both the Executive Summary and the body of the Patten mission report.]